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In this paper external disequilibrium in Brazil is sketched, the 1979 maxidevalu-
ation is discussed, and a well-known result of open macroeconomic theory is
restated, that is, that the cost of a successful devaluation is a reduction in real
wages. Whenever real or relative wages are resistant, a devaluation quickly
washes out.
THE ECONOMY
High rates of inflation and a large and growing external debt are the most
serious problems that Brazil faces nowadays. During the last 30 years (1950-79),
the average rate of inflation in Brazil has been 32 percent annually. Macro-
economic theory predicts that inflation rates tend to become rigid once govern-
ment adopts accommodating policies in relation to supply and demand shocks,
and relative wage stickness makes economic recessions inefficient as a means
of reducing inflation. Hence, although inflation rates vary over the business
cycles, at the end of each of them they are higher than before. This phenomenon
is illustrated in Chart 1, where average rates of inflation and of real growth
for each cycle of the Brazilian economy after 1950 are shown.
Table 1 shows inflation and growth rates for the last 12 years. Inflation ac-
celerated in the last six years and growth rates fell relative to the previous
period (1968-73). While inflation has been systematically higher, year after
year, growth has oscillated, reflecting the stop and go policy of the Simonsen
period (1974 to 1979).
Table 2 displays a summary of the Brazilian balance of payments from 1968
to 1979. Up to 1973, the trade balance was in equilibrium. The flow of direct in-
vestments and loans exceeded the deficit in the current account, making for an
overall surplus and accumulation of reserves.EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT 169
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In 1974, the oil shock and an increasing demand for imports doubled import
spending. Although exports grew 28 percent in that year, the trade deficit was
substantial, as was the deficit in services. Consequently the external debt
doubled. Between 1974 and 1978, export revenues covered only four-fifths of im-
port spending.
The growth differential between Brazil and its main trade partners lies be-
hind the trade deficits since 1974. Exports have not only been negatively af-
fected by world recession, but also by domestic cyclical effects. Equations esti-
mated by Cardoso and Dornbusch [2] point to a direct adverse effect of domestic
demand expansion relative to export capacity.
More than the trade deficits, the adverse behavior of the services account
contributed to the deterioration of the current balance. Chart 2 shows the share
of the current account deficit in GDP. Between 1968 and 1973, this share was
1.7 percent, and the growth differential between Brazil and the OECD coun-
tries was a plus 6.7 percent. In 1974, as the growth differential increased and
Brazilian terms of trade deteriorated, the share of the current account deficit
in GDP rose to 6.7 percent. From 1976 on, the growth differential fell (see
Table 3) and the terms of trade improved (due to coffee prices), contributing
to a reduction of the current account deficit. Nonetheless, the share of the deficit
in GDP during the more recent period has always been higher for the same
growth differentials during the previous period (1968-73). The explanation
lies in the rapid growth of interest payments, reflecting both the fast growing
external debt and the higher cost of foreign capital. Interest payments as a
share of total debt service in a given year rose from 4 percent to 5 percent in the
late 1960s to 8 to 9 percent in more recent years.EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT 171
The Brazilian government adopted an accommodating policy in relation to
balance of payments problems. Economic policy sustained economic activity
in the face of adverse shocks such as the oil price increases of 1973-74 and 1978—
79. The behavior of the current account reflects the option of keeping growth
rates high, even at the cost of an increasing external debt.
Up to mid-1979, the government did not use an active devaluation policy.
Since 1968, a system of minidevaluations was followed, in which the exchange
rate was adjusted periodically, based on the inflation differentials between
Brazil and the rest of the world. The result of this policy is illustrated in Chart
Chart 2
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3 which shows the nominal and real effective exchange rates for Brazil between
1959 and 1978.
1 The policy of a crawling peg, designed to offset inflation differ-
entials through exchange depreciation, is quite evident from inspection of
Chart 3.
The outstanding fact about the relative cost index is its substantial variability
prior to 1968 and the subsequent relatively stable behavior. The explanation for
the difference in behavior is clearly the exchange rate regime of Brazil. Until
1968 exchange rate policy was one of infrequent, large depreciations that were
Chart 3
NOMINAL AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES: BRAZIL, 1959-78 (1975 = 100)
1960 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 1978
EP*/P •= Real effective exchange rate.
E = Nominal effective exchange rate
E — Nominal dollar exchange rate.EXCHANGE RATE ADJ USTMENT 173
designed to undo the loss in competitiveness due to domestic inflation. From
1968 until late 1974 the minidevaluation policy substantially smoothed that
process.
The reluctance to use devaluations to stimulate exports and discourage im-
ports is understandable, given its undesirable effects on inflation. The conse-
quences of changing toward an active devaluation policy
2 are discussed in the
next sections.
THE PROBLEM
To judge from the preceding section, prospects for the Brazilian current ac-
count look bleak. Policies to correct trade deficits usually consist of either a
contraction in aggregate demand, that reduces imports temporarily, or a
change in relative prices, that would stimulate exports and discourage imports.
The government's policy commitments eliminates the first possibility. The
official view is that it is possible to correct the external disequilibrium through
a change in relative prices, obtainable through a devaluation. That belief lies
behind the 30 percent devaluation of December 1979.
Obviously, the positive effect of a devaluation can only be achieved if it is
actually translated into an increase in the price received by the exporter in
relation to the cost of production, inducing an increase in employment and
thus, an increase in income relative to spending.
8
It is worth observing that a nominal devaluation increases the cruzeiro price
received by the exporter, but it also increases the cruzeiro cost of imported in-
termediates. This implies that even immediately after the devaluation, the real
or effective depreciation is smaller than the nominal one. Beside that, the in-
crease in the price of intermediates not only raises the production costs for ex-
porters, but it also raises the cost of production for other domestically consumed
goods, inducing an increase in the cost of living. If wages are indexed to the
cost of living, production costs will rise further, reducing the effect of the de-
valuation. Devaluations are soon washed out in an economy where wages are
perfectly indexed.
This point can be readily illustrated by the use of a very simple model.
Assume the economy uses labor and an imported intermediate for the pro-
duction of a good. The price of output and labor are respectively P and W.
The supply of imported intermediates is infinitely elastic at a given world
price Pu* = 1; thus its price in domestic currency is equal to the exchange rate,
E.
The supply of gross output, Q, is an inverse function of the real wage rate and
of the real exchange rate:
Q = Q{W/P,E/P).174 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Output can be sold at home or abroad. Domestic demand depends on real
income, defined as y = Q(l — 9), where 9 is the unit share of intermediates
in gross output. Foreign demand depends on the price of competing goods,
P* s= 1, relative to the price of the good in dollars, P/E. Total demand for
goods is given by:
Q* = D(y)l+X(E/P).
Equilibrium in the goods market implies Q, = Q
d and can be represented by
the upward schedule KK in Chart 4, for a given nominal wage rate, W.
Since the price level is a weighted average of the wage and exchange rates,
the real exchange rate, E/P, that corresponds to a constant real wage rate,
W/P = w, can be represented by the ray OR in Chart 4.
Assume the economy is initially at A. A depreciation of the exchange rate
creates excess demand for our good and pushes its price up. The economy
moves to A
r, where employment and output are higher than before, at the cost
of a reduction in the real wage rate. At A' there is an improvement in the trade
balance, because domestic demand rises less than proportionally with income.
But, if wages are indexed to the price level, the nominal wage rate increases,
KK shifts up and the economy moves to A", where the effects on employment
and the trade balance disappear.
Although Brazilian minimum wages follow a government indexation rule, it
has been argued that most wages are not fully affected,
4 and that they are less
than perfectly indexed, leaving room for the devaluation to be effective.




1EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT 175
indexation rule: I assume that relative wages of skilled and nonskilled labor are
sticky. A supporting description of wages behavior in Brazil is found in [1].
The model in the next section also incorporates other assumptions relevant
to the Brazilian economy. It is shown that a devaluation cannot change the
real exchange rate, except in the very short run, if wages behave as described.
Thus, maxidevaluations are not the appropriate policy for moving relative
prices and correcting the Brazilian trade deficit.
THE MODEL
This section builds a model for an economy where an imported intermediate
is used for production of a good that is consumed at home and abroad. Demand
for exports is less than infinitely elastic. Nonskilled labor is less than fully em-
ployed and relative wages are sticky.
Gross output, Q, is produced by combining skilled labor, S, nonskilled labor,
JV, and an imported intermediate, M. There is substitution between skilled and
nonskilled labor, but the imported intermediate, whose supply is infinitely elastic
at a given world price, is used in fixed proportions. Thus.
(1) Q = min[F(JV,5), l/yM] = F{N9S),
where y is the quantity of intermediates necessary to obtain one unit of output,
a.
The cruzeiro price of the imported intermediate is equal to its international
price, Pu*, times the exchange rate, E. Assuming Pu* = 1, the cruzeiro of the
imported intermediate is E. The price of output, skilled labor, and nonskilled
labor are respectively P, W8, and Wn.
Profit maximization entails equality between the net marginal product of
each kind of labor and its real wage. Defining 0 se y E/P, I can write
(2) (l-9)Fn(N,S) =Wn/P.
(3) {1~$)F,{N,S) =W8/P.
Output can be sold at home or abroad. Domestic demand depends on real
income, defined as y= (1 — 9)Q. Foreign demand depends on the foreign
price of competing goods, P*, relative to the price of the domestically produced
good, in dollars, P/E. (Hereafter this latter good is called "our" good. Assum-
ing P* S3 1, foreign demand for "our" goods varies positively with E/P. Total
demand for "our" goods is given by
5
(4) Q* = D(y)+X(E/P).
In equilibrium,
(5) Q = Q
d-
The downward sloping schedule QQ in Chart 5 represents equilibrium in
"our" goods market as an inverse relationship between the two wage rates, for176 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
a given exchange rate and full employment of the skilled labor force.
6 Assume
an initial ratio between the wage rates, for which the goods market is in
equilibrium (given the exchange rate and full employment of skilled labor).
If the wage rate of nonskilled labor increases, employment falls and output is
reduced. The reduction in domestic demand is smaller than the fall in output,
since the marginal propensity to spend is less than one. Besides that, an in-
crease in the wage rate of nonskilled labor raises the price of "our" goods,
increasing real income and domestic demand. Those two effects contribute to
generate excess demand in the goods market. But there is still a third effect to
take into account. As the price of "our" goods rises, foreign demand falls,
generating excess supply. Given an elastic demand for "our" exports and low
substitutability, that third effect is stronger than the first two. In that case, a
rise in the wage rate of nonskilled labor generates excess supply in the market
for our goods.
7 To restore equilibrium, the wage rate of skilled labor has to fall,
thus reducing the price of "our" goods and restoring demand for exports, at
the same time as output rises.
Now look at the external accounts. In the absence of capital flows, the real
balance of payments reduces to the real trade balance, B, which is equal to
real exports minus the real imports of intermediates necessary to produce both
exports and domestically demanded output, that is,
(6) B = X(E/P) - 6[D(y) + X(E/P)].
The BB schedule in Chart 5 represents trade equilibrium, B = 0, for a given
exchange rate and full employment of skilled labor force, as an inverse rela-
tionship between the two wage rates.
8 Assume an initial trade equilibrium. A
rise in the nonskilled wage generates a deficit: as "our" price rises, export falls.
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librium, the wage rate of skilled labor has to fall, restoring competitiveness of
our exports.
Also observe that BB is steeper than QQ. The reason is the following:
Moving along QQ, to the right of the point where the two schedules intersect,
the unskilled labor wage rate rises and output falls. Since demand falls less
than proportionately with output, points along QQ, to the right of the inter-
section point, represent excess of spending over income, that is, trade deficits.
We complete the model assuming that relative wages are sticky and that the
wage rate of unskilled labor rises whenever it is below a given fraction of the
wage rate of skilled labor:
In Chart 5, Wn = 0 is represented as a ray through the origin. Short-run
equilibrium is shown at point A, where the skilled labor force is fully employed,
the wage rate is consistent with desired relative wages, and there is a trade
deficit.
I next explore the effects of a devaluation, beginning by looking at the im-
pact of the devaluation in goods market equilibrium. An increase in the ex-
change rate raises foreign demand but reduces domestic demand through a de-
terioration of real income. Since the first effect is assumed stronger than the
second, a devaluation generates excess demand in the market for "our" goods.
An increase in the wage rate of skilled labor restores equilibrium in "our" goods
market, as it reduces foreign demand through its impact on the price level and
augments supply as relative wages move, inducing more employment of un-
skilled labor. This implies that a devaluation shifts QQ up,
9 as shown in Chart
MoG'Q'.
Wn=O178 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Let us now look to the effects of the devaluation on the BB schedule: for
given wage rates, an increase in the exchange rate expands net exports while
the importation of intermediates for the production of domestically demanded
output falls, because of the deterioration of real income. An increase in the
wage rate of skilled labor restores trade balance equilibrium, as it reduces net
exports and raises imports. These facts imply an upward shift of the BB
schedule,
1
0 as shown in Chart 6.
As shown in Chart 6, so long as the wage rate of unskilled labor is held con-
stant, a devaluation increases demand for "our" goods. The wage rate of
skilled labor and the price level rise, and, as the real wage for unskilled labor
falls, employment expands. As output expands more than spending, the trade
balance improves.
1
1 This is illustrated by the shift from A to A' in Chart 6.
But A
f is not an equilibrium point, since relative wages are different from
those desired. Hence, the wage rate of nonskilled labor increases and both the
gain in competitiveness and the improvement in the trade balance are lost.
If the wage rate of skilled labor is fully flexible, the economy moves to A", where
both wage rates and the price level will have increased by the same amount as
the exchange rate, leaving employment and the trade balance unchanged.
Now take into account the case where nominal wage rates are rigid down-
ward. As the wage rate of nonskilled labor rises to restore desired relative
wages, and the wage of skilled labor does not fall, we move to A'", where there
is unemployment in both labor markets, because for the given exchange rate,
real wages are too high to permit full employment. A'" also represents excess
supply of "our" goods, because, for the given exchange rate, "our" price level is
too high to make "our goods" competitive. Suppliers would like to sell more at
the going prices, but they are demand-constrained and output is reduced, as







1 NEXCHANGE RATE ADJ USTMENT 179
A
1" represents a Keynesian "equilibrium," where output is demand-deter-
mined and there is unemployment of both kinds of labor.
Although the devaluation would have improved the trade balance in the
very short run, at the cost of a reduction in the wage rate of nonskilled labor,
its results in the long run look bleak. Not only its effects on the trade balance
disappear, but a devaluation may well induce a reduction in employment and
a further deterioration of the trade balance. This will be the case if, exports
being highly demand-elastic, the wage rate of the fully employed skilled labor
force overshoots the devaluation and is downward rigid.
CONCLUSIONS
The oil shock affected the Brazilian trade balance badly. Between 1968 and
1973, policies of indexation and public investment coincided with an interna-
tional boom, resulting in the so-called Brazilian miracle: in those years, real
GDP grew on average 11.5 percent annually, inflation rates were kept under
control, and exports, after 20 years of relative stagnation, grew 24.6 percent a
year. Since 1974, internal and external shocks reverted the behavior of macro
variables. Growth rates fell, inflation accelerated, and external accounts se-
verely deteriorated. By mid-1979, faced with large trade deficits and a growing
external debt, the government turned to an active devaluation policy.
In this paper I have argued that a devaluation can improve the trade balance
in the short run, at the cost of a reduction in the real wage of unskilled labor,
as long as unskilled labor can substitute for skilled labor.
If there is no possibility of substitution between the two kinds of labor, the
level of output is determined by full employment of the skilled labor force and
a devaluation simply transfers income from nonskilled to skilled labor, leaving
the trade deficit unchanged.
If there is the possibility of substitution, as long as the real wage rate of un-
skilled labor falls, employment expands and the trade balance improves. As the
wage rate of nonskilled labor rises to restore historically determined relative
wages, the trade balance improvement is lost. On the other hand, the wage rates
of skilled labor could overshoot the devaluation. As they are downward rigid,
domestic prices would tend to rise more than the devaluation, after the ad-
justment of all wages. Adverse effects on competitiveness and employment would
result. I can thus conclude that an active devaluation policy is not the right
instrument to move relative prices in Brazil and that, once it is coupled with
wage earners' attempts to restore relative wages, it will lead to an acceleration
of inflation.180 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
NOTES
* I am indebted to Rudi Dornbusch for comments.
1. The nominal effective exchange rate, E'', was constructed as the trade-weighted
8
index of the cruzeiro price of foreign exchange E = E 2 atEi} where Et is the index
of the dollar price of the ith currency and E is the index of the cruzeiro price of the
US dollar. The dollar exchange rates are reported in the IFS Yearbook. The real
effective exchange rate is defined as EP*/P, where P, the Brazilian index for whole-
sale prices, is an index in cruzeiros reported in Conjuntura Economica, Column 2;
P*, the foreign wholesale price is a trade-weighted average of wholesale prices of the
main trading partners. I used moving weights for three periods and converted the
price indexes into $US using the respective countries' dollar exchange rate. The re-
sulting index of foreign prices, P* was then converted at the official exchange rate
into cruzeiros to yield EP*. For details and data see [3] which develops and interprets
various alternative measures of the real exchange rate.
2. An estimate of the real exchange rate in manufacturing reported by Morgan
Guaranty shows a substantial real depreciation in the last year. See Morgan Guar-
anty, World Financial Markets, January 1980.
3. This argument applies to a less than fully employed economy. In the full em-
ployment case, a devaluation will only be effective if combined with an expenditure-
reducing policy. See, for example, [4].
4. See, for example, [5].
5. The model leaves aside nontraded goods and imported final goods. Nonetheless
substitution effects are already captured by a price elastic demand for exports.
6. To obtain the slope of QQ, substitute Equations (1) and (4) into (5). Dif-
ferentiate totally the system formed by Equation (2), (3), and (5), assuming dS =
dE = 0. It follows that
(2') N{\ - 9) FnnN' + [{WJP) + 9Fn}P> - (WJP) Wn' = 0.
(3') N(l-O) FtnN' + [{WJP) + 9F,]P' - {WJP) W/ = 0.
(5') an¥tf' + AP' = 0,
where 9 = XE/P; *==l-g(l-0) with q==BD/dy; \==£-q6 with £s=s
{dX/dE/P) [{E/P)/Q]; and «n = NFJQj a.s= SFJQj «n + a, = 1.
Observethat Fnn = -{S FnFs)/{N Q<r) and F8n = {FnFt)/{Q<r), where a is the elasticity of substitution between N and S. Obtain expressions for N' and P' as
functions of W/ and Wn' from Equations (2') and (3'), which can be substituted
into Equation (5) to get
WV/WV I Qfi = [* a - X (1 - *)]/[** + X(l - 9) («./«.)].
7. The condition for excess supply to occur when the wage rate of nonskilled labor
rises is that A(l — 9) >'%<T. Values for the elasticity of substitution between the
two kinds of labor less than or equal to one, and values for the elasticity of demand
for our exports greater than or equal to one are sufficient for that condition to hold
true. In what follows I assume that QQ slopes downward. The reader can easily work
out the case in which it slopes upward.
8. To obtain the slope of BB I differentiate Equation (6) totally, assuming dE =
dS - 0, and B = 0.
(6') [- |(1 - 9) + 9T - 9q dy/Q = 0.EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT 181
Observe that Equation (6) can also be written as B = y — D(y). Trade equilib-
rium implies equality between income and spending. Since the marginal propensity
to spend is less than one, 5 = 0 only if dy = 0.
From Equation (2') and (3'), I obtain an expression for P' as a function of W8
and Wn' which I can substitute into Equation (6'):
(W8'/Wn')\BB=-(aJa8)
9. The upward shift of QQ is measured by
QQf = [X(l ~ 0)]/[(l ~ d)Xa8 + ¥<raj.
10. The upward shift of BB is measured by
BB = [1/(1-8) a8].
11. Changes in W8, P, N, and 5 induced by the change in E, for a constant Wn
are given by
W8'/E' = (1 - 9) A/t(l - 0) X a8 + <r¥an] > 0;
1 > P'JE' = [(1 - 8)Xa8 + o*an 8]/[(l - 8)Xa8 + a*an] > 0.
W/E' = [(1 - 8) X<r]/[(l - 8(Xa8 + <r*a] > 0;
dB/Q = [- |(1 - 8) + 8] [P
f - E'].
Observe that, if a = 0, then W/ = (l/a8)E
f; and P' = E', N' = dB/Q = 0.
This means that if there is no possibility of substitution between the two kinds of
labor, then a devaluation simply transfers income from nonskilled to skilled labor
and leaves both employment and the trade deficit unchanged.
REFERENCES
1. Eliana Cardoso, "Shocks, Accommodation Policy and Relative Wages," mimeo
(INPES).
2. and Rudiger Dornbusch, "An Equation for Brazilian Exports of Manu-
factures," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Vol. 34 (jul/set. 1980), pp. 429-37.
3. , "Nominal and Real Exchange Rates for Brazil: 1959-1978," in Three
Papers on Brazilian Trade and Payments, Working Paper No. 541, National Bureau
of Economic Research (New York, 1980).
4. Rudiger Dornbusch, "Money Devaluation and Non-Traded Goods," American
Economic Review, Vol. 63 (December 1973), pp. 871-80.
5. R. Macedo and M. Garcia, "Observacoes sobre a Politica Brasileira de Salario
Minimo," mimeo. (Fundacao Instituto de Pesquisas Economias Universidade de
Sao Paulo).